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"Man acts in order to be."—man exists in and through his actions. 
This is the teaching that Hegel bequeathed to us (via Kojeve through 
Bataille, to be precise). This "action" must not be understood negatively 
in the sense of preservation; otherwise animals can be said to enjoy the 
same kind of existence as human beings do. Man differs from animals in 
that he is self-conscious: he is conscious of himself, of his human 
reality and dignity. It is Self-Consciousness that constitutes man's 
being. 
What gives birth to Self-Conscdousness? Is it in thinking, in theo-
rizing and contemplation, that man becomes conscious of himself? No. 
Contemplation reveals only the contemplated, the object. The subject on 
his part is "absorbed" in the act of contemplation. He can be brought 
back to himself only by Desire, which is revealed to him as his Desire. 
In his Desire the subject becomes conscious of the object as the object 
of a subject. The object of contemplation now becomes a object of Desire 
presented to a subject, which is different from this object and is op-
posed to it. It is only through his Desire that man becomes conscious 
of himself. "It is in and by—or better still, a s 丨 his，Desire that man is 
formed and is revealedto himself and to others~as an I, as the I that 
is essentially different from, and radically opposed to, the non-I. The 
(human) I is the I of a Desire or of Desire."^ 
Desire gives birth to action, which tends to satisfy it. Following 
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Hegel, Kojdve understands Desire as lack (emptiness) and action as ne-
gating, for it satisfies Desire by destroying or transforming its object, 
by assimilating something foreign to the I: 
Generally speaking, the I of Desire is an emptiness that receives 
a real positive content only by negating action that satisfies 
Desire in destroying, transforming, and "assimilating" the de-
sired non-I. And the positive content of the I, constituted by 
negation, is a function of the positive content of the negated 
non-I. If, then, the Desire is directed toward a "natural" non-I, 
the 1, too, will be "natural". The I created by the active satis-
faction of such a Desire will have the same nature as the things 
toward which that Desire is directed:比 will be a "thingish" I, 
a merely living I an animal I. And this natural I, a function of 
the natural object, can be revealed to itself and to others only 
as Sentiment of self. It will never attain Self-Conscdjousness.^  
Hence Desire, though necessary for the genesis of Self-Conscious-
ness, is not its sufficient condition. If natural Desire is all that he has, 
man is still bound within animal reality. By itself. Desire constitutes 
only the Sentiment of self. In order to attain Self-Consciousness, Desire 
must be directed toward a non-natural object, to something that is not 
simply given. The only thing that suits this requirement is Desire itself: 
••Desire, being the revelation of an emptiness, the presence of the ab-
sence of a reality, is something essentially different from the desired 
thing, something other than a thing, than a static and given real being 
that stays eternally identical to itself. Therefore, Desire directed toward 
another Desire, taken as Desire, will create, by the negating and assind-
lating action that satisfies it, an I essentially different from the animal 
The animal Desire is always directed toward a real, given object. It 
2 
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gives rise only to a natural being, whose life is maintained only on the 
biological level and which has only a Sentiment of self, that is, a senti-
ment of its lifeu Human Desire, insofar as it is a human Desire, must be 
directed to another Desire instead of a real, given object. What it seeks 
in this other Desire is recognition. When a man desires a woman, his 
Desire goes beyond animality only when his Desire is directed not to 
her body but to her Desire, that is, when his Desire wants to possess, 
to assimilate her Desire, when he wants to be desired, loved, or, rather, 
recognized by her as an individual, as a human being. 
For man to be truly human, human Desire must overcome animal De-
sire. As the animal Desire is but a sentiment for life, that is, a desire 
for its preservation, human Desire wins out over animal Desire only 
when man chooses to risk his life for its fulfillment. 
Man's humanity "comes to light" only in risking his life to 
satisfy his human Desire~that is, his Desire directed toward 
another Desire. Now, to desire a Desire is to want to substitute 
oneself for the value desired by this Desire. For without this 
substitution, one would desire the value, the desired object, and 
not the Desire itself. Therefore, to desire the Desire of another 
is in the final analysis to desire that the value that I am or that 
I "represent" be the value desired by the other: I want him to 
"recognize" my value as his value. I want him to "recognize" me 
as an autonomous value. In other words, all human, anthroge-
netic Desirethe Desire that generates Self-Consciousness, the 
human realityis, finally, a function of the Desire for "recog-
nition." And the risk of life by which the human reality "comes 
to light" is a risk for the sake of such a Desire. Therefore, to 
speak of the "origin" of Self-Consciousness is necessarily to 
speak of a fight to the death for "recognition".^ 
Self-Conscdousness exists only in being recognized. In order to be 
3 
• 
recognized, it needs another Self-Consciousness. "Self-consciousness is 
faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has 
a twofold significance; first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an 
other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it 
does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its 
own self."^ What the Self-Consciousness is looking for in another Self-
Consciousness is its recognition. That is, it does not recognize the other 
Self-Consciousness as an autonomous being, but only as something in 
which it can find its own recognition. The other Self-Consciousness on 
its part also seeks to be recognized by this Self-Consciousness, which 
it does not recognize either. Thus the confrontation of two Self-Con-
scdousness (or rather, two beings in the process of becoming Self-Con-
sciousness) becomes a fight for recognition. However, if both parties 
behave in the same manner, the fight would end in the death of one or 
t 
both parties. This outcome is undesirable even for the survivor, for it 
cannot seek recognition from a dead adversary. 
This fight for recognition, for Kojeve, points to the center of Hegel's 
Phenomenoloq y • For man to attain Self-Consciousness, in order that the 
human reality become a "recognized" reality, both parties must remain 
alive after the fight. This is possible only if they behave differently in 
this fight. One party must give in to the other. He must give up his 
Desire and satisfy the Desire of the other, "he must 'recognize' the 
other without being 'recognized' by him. Now 'to recognize' him thus is 
•to recognize' him as Master and to recognize himself and to be recog-
nized as the Master's Slave."^ 
Let us consider this relation in detail. Self-Consciousness, in Hegel's 






is subjectively certain that his being-for-itself is manifest to him as an 
autonomous, unified (in other words, selfsame) subject. Yet in order for 
this subjective-certainty to become a reality, i.e., to be intersubjectively 
recognized, he needs an Other, i.e" another man as Self-Consciousness 
to recognize him. This other Self-Consciousness has become the end of 
his action. His value and his human reality depend on the recognition 
of this other. Therefore, he is "outside of himself". But his own value 
and his own reality are what are important to him, and he wants to 
have them in himself. Hence, he must overcome this otherness, he must 
have in himself the certainty of being recognized by the other. But for 
that recognition to satisfy him, he must know that this other is also a 
human being. He must know that this other also wants to be recognized, 
and would also risk his life for the recognition of his own being-for-
itself. In order to ascertain this, he would have to, as it were, provoke 
the other to fight with him for his recognition. Yet the result of the 
fight will be the death of one or both adversaries, which is undesirable. 
Even if he wins, he will not be satisfied, for he cannot seek recognition 
from a dead adversary. Death is the natural negation of consciousness. 
It overcomes a consciousness by depriving it of life and hence causing 
it to cease being a consciousness. "Therefore, it does the man of the 
Fight no good to kill his adversary. He must overcome him 'dialectically/ 
That is, he must leave him life and consciousness, and destroy only his 
autonomy. He must overcome the adversary insofar as the adversary is 
opposed to him and acts against him. In other words, he must enslave 
The man who is defeated, who in the fight has not gone all the way 
in risking his life, accepted the life granted to him by his adversary, 
5 
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and hence becomes dependent on the other. By remaining alive, he be-
comes a Slave. The victor, on the other hand, has held to his principle, 
"to conquer or to die", and conquered. He is the Master. 
The Master is the consciousness that exists for itself, but no 
longer merely the concept of such a consciousness. Rather, it is 
a consciousness existing for itself which is mediated with itself 
through another consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness 
whose nature it is to be bound up with an existence that is in-
dependent, or thinghood in general.® 
This another consciousness is the Slave who, by refusing to risk his 
life for recognition, remains within the given, bound to his animal-life. 
Both he and the Master consider himself as such. The Master, on the 
other hand' is considered by the Slave in his human reality and dig-
nity. His certainty, therefore, is no longer subjective but objectivized 
and "mediated" by another (the Slave's) consciousness; while the Slave's 
still remains an immediate consciousness.^ 
The Master, as the vixjtor of the fight, is recognized by the Slave 
in his human reality and dignity. But he on his part does not recognize 
the Slave in return. Therefore, he is recognized by someone whom he 
does not recognize. This is his dissatisfaction: he has fought and risked 
his life for the recognition of someone whom he himself does not recog-
nize—that is' recognize as human. So after all his Desire is directed 
toward a thing and not' as he would have wished, toward another 
human Desire. He is, in Kojdve丨s terms, in "an existential impasse". 
The Slave, on the other hand, recognizes the Master from the start. 
Hence it is possible for him to attain the mutual recognition (Le., to be 
recognized by someone that he recognizes) which alone can realize and 
satisfy man. In order to do so, he must cease to become Slave and im-
6 
pose himself on the Master and to be recognized by him. That is, he 
must "overcome" himself as Slave: 
if the Master has no desire to "overcome"~and hence no possi-
bility of "overcoming"—himself as Master (since this would mean, 
for him, to be a Slave), the Slave has every reason to cease to 
be a Slave. Moreover, the experience of the fight that made him 
a Slave predisposes him to that act of self-overcoming, of nega-
tion of himself (negation of this given I, which is a slavish I). 
To be sure, in the beginning, the Slave who binds himself to his 
given (slavish) I does not have this "negativity" in himself. He 
sees it in the Master, who realized pure "negating-negativity" 
by risking his life in the fight for recognition.^ ® 
So in the end it is the Slave who wins. The Master succeeded in his 
fight for recognition, yet this recognition of his human reality is to be 
found elsewhere, in someone other than himself, whom he does not re-
cognize as human. He has risked his life to become Master, and he can-
not go further, beyond it. The Slave on his part is not bound to what 
he is, he wants to transcend himself by his action, i.e. by negating his 
present state. He has an ideal to attain, the ideal of autonomy, of Being-
for-itself, of which his finds personified in his Master. 
The complete, absolutely free man, definitively and completely 
satisfied by what he is, the man who is perfected and completed 
in and by this satisfaction, will be the Slave who has "overcome" 
his Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in 
contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress. 
History is the history of the working Slave. 
The future and History hence belong not to the warlike Master, 
who either dies or preserves himself indefinitely in identity to 
himself, but to the working Slave. The Slave, in transforming the 
given World by his work, transcends the given and what is 
given by that given in himself; hence, he goes beyond himself, 
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and also goes beyond the Master. . . 
The Slave, in his work, becomes the master of Nature such that he 
(as subject) will come across nothing outside of himself (as object) to 
impede his actions. This is the concrete meaning that Kojeve has given 
to Hegel's idea of the unity of subject and object, namely. Absolute 
knowledge. 
Absolute knowledge, that is. Wisdom, presupposes the total 
success of Man's Negative Action. This knowledge is possible 
only 1) within a homogeneous and universal State where no man 
is exterior to another, where there is no social opposition which 
is not suppressed, and 2) in the midst of a Nature that has be 
tamed by the labour of Man, and which, no longer opposing Man, 
12 
ceases to be alien to him. 
II. 
The other does not exist: this is rational faith, the incurable 
belief of human reason. Identity=reality, as if, in the end, every-
thing must necessarily and absolutely be one and the same. But 
the other refuses to disappear; it subsists, it persists; it is the 
hard bone on which reason breaks its teeth. Abel Martin, with 
a poetic faith as human as rational faith, believed in the other, 
in "the essential Heterogeneity of being", in what might be 
called the incurable otherness from which oneness must suffer. 
Antonio Machado 
It is not a question of proposing that we think otherwise, if this 
means to think some other thing. Rather, it is thinking that 
which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise. There is 
produced in the thought of the impossibility of the otherwise, in 
8 
this not otherwise, a certain difference, a certain trembling, a 
certain decentering that is not the position of an other center. 
Jacques Derrida 
Kojive's reading of Hegel sets the itinerary for the articulation of 
and confrontation with the question of difference and otherness, a pro-
blem that has troubled philosophy since its earliest days•以 The philoso-
phical discourse is marked by a concern for its limits. Even when the 
dream of a royal science is given up, when it no longer claims to be 
able to determine the limits of individual sciences, philosophy still 
insists on drawing the limit between itself (philosophy) and what it con-
siders to be its other (non-philosophy). Indeed, it is Socrates the philo-
sopher who wants to be distinguished from the sophists (and not vice 
versa). In Levinas' words, from the days of its infancy philosophy has 
been struck with "a horror of the other that remains other"; hence it 
is primarily a philosophy of Being, that is, a metaphysics and an onto-
logy, where "the comprehension of Being is its last word, and the fun-
damental structure of man";^ ^ and where identity, or self sameness, is 
considered the basic trait of Being. Plato, in his investigation into the 
nature of the "really real" (ontos on), locates the mark of Being in self-
hood: to be is to be "its own self according to itself" (auto kath' auto). 
Just as the I cannot become another without risking losing its ipseity 
and hence, its being. Being must be free of all otherness. 
In Modern philosophy, the sovereign site that used to be occupied 
by Being is taken over by the Subject. Descartes finds that what is 
most certain, indubitable and fundamental, is his own doubting ego, the 
res cogiiians. From this self-certain ego he seeks to establish the reality 
of all other things by relating them to the subject, as what the subject 
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sets before (vor-stellen) itself. As a result, the subject's relation to all 
otherness is mediated by its relation to itself. 
Hegel's system marks the consummation of the philosophy of the 
subject. With his idea of the dialectic, Hegel seeks to establish the 
identity of identity and difference, the reconciliation of the Same and 
the Other, and—as it emerges, finally, in Kojeve's interpretationthe 
interplay of the rational and the irrational. 
Won-dialectical thinking would hold to the opposition between the 
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rational and the irrational, but anything thinking which aspires 
to be dialectical must, by definition, induce reason a movement 
towards what is entirely foreign to it, towards the other. The 
whole issue now rests upon whether the other has been re-
turned to the same in the course of this movement, or whether 
(so as to embrace rational and irrational, the same and the 
other, at once) reason will have to had to transform itself, losing 
its initial identity, ceasing to be the same and becoming with the 
other.U 
In Hegel's philosophy of the subject, we find that the nature of De-
sire is to abolish the otherness of the Other. Self-Consciousness exists 
in and for itself inasmuch as it is recognized. It therefore lives outside 
itself in another Self-Consciousness, in which it finds but also loses 
itself (as this itself is found elsewhere). As Self-Consciousness strives 
to eliminate this alien selfhood, it seeks to eliminate the Other in order 
to achieve its own self-certainty, and also to eliminate itself in this 
process, since it is itself the Other. However, Hegel thinks that this 
elimination involves a return to self, since what is eliminated is its own 
otherness. 
And yet, the question of the Other does not simply close with Hegel, 
just as the Sophist does not conclude with a happy ending where the 
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sophists are dispelled and the philosopher crownedin fact at the end 
of the dialogue it seems that we are no longer able to tell the philo-
sopher from his crafty imitators. Hegel's treatment of otherness has left 
many questions open: Does his dialectiacl reconciliation of opposites 
actually represent identity's dominance over difference? Is this recon-
ciliation an act of violence where the Other is repressed in favour of 
the Same? What is repressed in this reconciliation? Does the repressed 
return to subvert the System? These have become some of the central 
t 
questions in contemporary French philosophy. The works of many im-
portant French thinkers can be understood as responses to the Hegelian 
story of the homecoming of the Same. As Deleuze himself notes, com-
menting on the intellectual atmosphere in the late sixties, from the rise 
of structuralism to the nouveau roman: "all these signs may be attri-
buted to a generalized anti-Hegelianism. Difference and repetition have 
replaced the identical and the negative, identity and contradiction 
Philosophers and writers have tried to challenge the happy ending that 
•Hegel has given to the story of the Same and the Other, where the 
Same finally returns to itself. They have, in one way or another, 
attempted to unmask the aversion that philosophy experiences in the 
face of Otherness. The following saying of Levinas might well serve as 
their motto: 
To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose 
the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a 
yet unknown land, and forbids his servants to even bring back 
his son to the point of departure•� 
Another backdrop to our study is the talk about "going beyond 




though its origins can be traced back much earlier to the nineteenth 
century. It is commonly understood that Nietzsche proclaims that philo-
sophy as metaphysics is at its end: from his declaration that God is 
dead, that the idea of Being is the last smoke of evaporating reality, to 
the story of "how the real world finally becomes a fable"the history 
of the error known to him as metaphysics. Metaphysics is the belief in 
a ultimate ground of beings, a stable structure that governs becoming 
and gives meaning to knowledge and norms to practice. In his writings 
Nietzsche announces repeatedly the effacement of this ground. Yet what 
this effacement amounts to remains to be clarified. Is Nietzsche setting 
forth an attack on what metaphysics has chosen to be its object, that 
is, what it has contended to occupy the place of the ultimate ground 
(God, Being, etc.)? Is he simply trying to put some other things in the 
place that used to be occupied by these objects? Or has he managed to 
put an end to metaphysics itself, the kind of thinking that evokes the 
place? 
Does the recuperation of religion stop us being religious? By 
turning theology into an anthropology, by putting man in God's 
place, do we abolish the essential, that is to say, the place? 
(NP pp. 88-89) 
As Nietzsche himself notes—and as the history of philosophy from 
Kant to Hegel has taught us, metaphysics does not simply terminate. It 
keeps on returning and casts its shadow over those proclaiming its end. 
New Struggles.-— After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still 
shown for centuries in a cave~a tremendous, gruesome shadow. 
God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves 
for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. 
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—And w e w e still have to vanquish his shadow, too. 
(GS 108) 
The project of going beyond metaphysics must also put itself under 
its scrutiny. After proclaiming the end of metaphysics, the thinker not 
only has to vanquish its shadow but also to beware of the shadow, to 
be careful not to be drawn into it, this is, he must be careful not to let 
his thinking become a returning of metaphysics. —Indeed, he has to be 
on guard even against the idea of a "Beyond of metaphysics" itself. 
This phrase must not be taken to be meaning that the thinker who suc-
ceeded in vanquishing metaphysics will be able to transcend it, as if he 
has crossed over a limit into another domain and is never coming back. 
As Nietzsche notices, if metaphysics is the sickness that keeps yearning 
for a Beyond (GS 2), then its overcoming must also include an over-
coming of the desire for a Beyond (in capital) of metaphysics. For the 
ideas of limit and Beyond themselves belong to the metaphysical tra-
dition. 
Because of this self-referentiality (or reflexivity), the task of an 
overcoming of metaphysics could not but appear paradoxical. This essay 
is concerned with such a paradox. Our procedure is to review this pro-
blem as it appears in the interpretation of Nietzsche by GiUes Deleuze. 
Deleuze's first book on Nietzsche, Nietzsche and Philosophy, appeared 
in 1962, at a time when Nietzsche received relatively little attention as 
a serious thinker. Apart from the frenzied poet-thinker and the pro-
fascist, the only alternatives were the sombre metaphysician portrayed 
by Heidegger and the Lebensphilosoph/cultural critic (of Kaufmann's, for 
example). By the late 1960，s, a new cluster of Nietzsche interpretations 
arose in the works of French philosophers. A "new Nietzsche" began to 
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emerge from the readings of, among others, Deleuze, Klossowski, Fou-
18 
cault and Derrida. The originality of these interpretations consists in 
their attempt to take Nietzsche "sufficiently seriously" (GM p. 23). Given 
Nietzsche's repugnance to philosophical systems, these thinkers have 
tried to see how Nietzsche could avoid having one (instead of trying to 
show that despite himself Nietzsche did have a system)—^or, if he did 
produce something that looked like a system, how is this "system" of 
his different from those of traditional philosophers. If Nietzsche claimed 
that "every philosophy so far has been • • • the personal confession of 
its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir" and that 
"the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the 
real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown" (BGE 6) they 
have tried to find out how it would be if these claims were applied to 
Nietzsche's own thinking. Above all and despite the differences among 
them, these French thinkers have tried to follow Nietzsche's claim that 
"God is dead"~that it is no longer possible to conceive of an ultimate 
ground, a stable structure that governs becoming and gives meaning to 
knowledge and norms to practice. Among these readings of Nietzsche 
Deleuze's is representative not only for its historical significance but 
also for the subtlety for his treatment. In contrast to those who con-
sider Nietzsche solely as a Lebensphilosoph or the metaphysician of will 
to power, the myriad themes of Nietzsche's thought, from the analysis 
of ressentiment to the idea of history as the advance of nihilism and to 
his critique of metaphysics, all receive their consideration and are 
located within a single, consistent project. Deleuze's interpretation has 
opened up the many questions that became central in subsequent Nie-
tzsche studies, among which~and comprising the subject of this essay— 
14 
is the problem of reflexivity in the attempt to overcome metaphysics. 
Put most crudely, our question is this: Philosophers such as Nietzsche 
have tried to think in a way that is otherwise than the metaphysical 
tradition; but is this possible? How can we think otherwise than the 
metaphysical tradition and not only think some other things in the 
traditional manner? Part I of the essay is an exposition of Deleuze's 
interpretation of Nietzsche as it appears in his Nietzsche and Philo-
sophy. Then in Part II this interpretation will be evaluated in the light 
of the problem mentioned above, and a sketch will be given of the kind 
of thinking "beyond metaphysics" (without the capital "B") that Deleuze 
and Nietzsche call for. Our thesis is that since the attempt of a over-
coming of metaphysics must recognize the self-referentiality of such an 
undertaking, a radical overcoming of metaphysics is impossible, as it 
evokes the totalizing way of thinking that is characteristic of meta-
physics. 
One final remark about the title of this essay. The phrase "philo-
sophy of difference" has generally been used to describe the thinking 
of philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida, as each of their 
philosophies is engaged, in its own way, in the search for a "difference 
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in itself", in the movement from the Same to the Other. In traditional, 
metaphysical thinking, difference is suppressed in many ways. Differ-
ence is traditionally considered to be a difference from or within some-
thing; and behind this difference (among individuals) there must be the 
unity of a group (the genus), which is manifested in the concept. Thus, 
difference can only be represented in relation to a conceived identity, 
and must be specified within a concept. Closely linked to the concept 
is the idea of representation. "For the concept to master difference, 
15 
perception must apprehend global resemblances (which will then be 
decomposed into differences and partial identities) at the root of what 
we call diversity. Each new representation must be accompanied by 
those representations that display the full range of resemblances; and 
in this space of representation (sensation-image-memory), likeness are 
put to the test of quantitative equalization and graduated quantities, 
and in this way the immense table of measurable difference is con-
structed."^ At the zero point of this table (the point of smallest quan-
titative gap and smallest qualitative variation), we will find the case of 
perfect resemblance, i.e., exact repetition. 
In this thinking which Deleuze and Poucault call "philosophy of 
representation", the ability of a thing to be re-presented, to be re-
discovered as the same in its repetition, constitutes the mark of its 
identity. Difference arises when representation can only partially re-
present what was previously present. "To be different" is understood 
negatively as not to be the same. Thus difference can exist insofar as 
it is defined negatively through the operations of negation and contra-
dkstkm. In this negative understanding of difference, the philosophy of 
representation moves towards a dialectical way of thinking: "The dia-
lectical sovereignty of sdmilarity consists in permitting differences to 
exist, but always under the rule of the negative, as an instance of non-
being. They may appear as the successful subversion of the Other, but 
contradictijDn secretly assists in the salvation of identities."^^ As will be 
seen, in his interpretation of Nietzsche Deleuze takes dialectical thinking 
as his chief rival, and his principle aim is to provide a non-negative 
understanding of difference: "The freeing of difference requires thought 
without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation; thought that 
16 
accepts divergence, affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction; 
* 
thought of the multiple~of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that 
22 
is not limited or confined by the constraints of similarity. • • •“ Just 
as the nomads who spread themselves over a territory without dividing, 
but with each member taking what he can, reaching a limit only at the 
point where he can go no further, in a manner that is an-arche, without 
any supreme principle. . . . 
ni . (In lieu of a foreword) 
To know that one does not write for the other . . . , to know 
that writing compensates for nothing, sublimates nothing, that 
it is precisely there where you are notthis is the beginning 
of writing. 
Roland Barthes 
"For me, writing is extremely hard work." Strictly speaking, what 
is being done here does not yet deserve the name "writing". It is more 
of an indicatijon of laziness and stupidity. On my part I only hope that 
this essay can at least be the first step towards a kind of active, pro-
ductive reading, the "reading in intensity". . . • 
"Nonetheless, writing can also be fun. Compared to the sheer dif-
ficulty of living, the process of attaching meanings to life is altogether 
clear sailing." Among those who have brought more fun to my college 
life than it deserved, I would especially like to mention the following: 
I would like to thank Dr Kwan Tze-Wan, my supervisor, for the freedom 
that he has granted me and, above all, for his confidence in me even 
though I have let him down once and again. I am also grateful to Dr Ho 
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Hsiu-Hwang for his patience. To Chan Chi-Wai, for his advice, concern 
and many other things, I am thankful as always. Special thanks are due 
to Yip Chi-Bun and Rosalia for they know why. ("A friend to kill time 
is a friend sublime," so the Rat said.) Finally, I want to thank . . . (who 
insists on remaining anonymous) for her liveliness and unfailing sup-
port, and Kwai Sze-Ka for her amitie. Perhaps one day I would be able 
to write something for them. 
For better or worse—— 
May 1991 
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Part I 
Nietzsche and Philosophy 
Hoc enim propria vivit quod est sine principio. 
"Only that which is without a principle lives properly." 
Meister Eckhart 
. -
Nietzsche's Critical Philosophy 
1. Introduction 
"Nietzsche's most general project is the introduction of the concepts 
of sense and value into philosophy." (NP p. 1) With these words Deleuze 
places Nietzsche within the tradition of critical Philosophy. The philo-
sophy of sense and value is a critique; and this critique seeks to com-
plete the idea of critical philosophy inaugurated by Kant. 
One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had 
not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose 
the critique in terms of values. And what has happened in 
modern philosophy is that the theory of values has given rise 
to a new conformism and new forms of submission. • • • But, with 
Nietzsche, we must begin from the fact that the philosophy of 
values as envLsaged and established by him is the true reali-
zation of critique and the only way in which a total critique may 
be realized, the only way to "philosophize with a hammer". 
(NP p. 1) 
Kant is the first philosopher to conceive of a total and positive, af-
firmative critique. It is total, because it intends to put everything 
under its scrutiny; affirmative, because the setting up of bounds to the 
legitimate use of one faculty is done for the sake of the unbinding of 
the power of other faculties. But it turns out that his own critique fails 
to fulfil this conception. According to Nietzsche, Kant's failure lies in 
his exclusion of values from his critique. Kant only puts forward a cri-
tique on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and 
truth themselves. He assumes the value of truth, goodness and beauty, 
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and his critique is wholly subservient to these values as their justi-
fication: "It is Nietzsche rather than Kant who accomplishes the project 
for a critical philosophy; indeed, Kant ventures neither a critique of 
truth (science) nor of the good (morality). His critique is confined to 
false science (dogmatic metaphysics) and false morality (heteronomy). 
Nietzsche, who is both Kant's heir and his adversary, directs his cri-
tique at true science and true morality. He demonstrates 'with a hammer' 
that science as s u c h t h e desire for truthoriginates in morality, in the 
'ascetic ideal*, and that morality as such is the result of resentment 
against life••“ 
The critical philosophy of values proceeds by inquiring into the 
grounds of these values, delineating their lineage to their origin. This 
is the crux of the idea of a genealogical method. Just as meanings are 
related to readings, values come from evaluations, that is, the ways of . 
being or the modes of existence of those who evaluate. 
Critical philosophy has two inseparable moments: the referr-
ing back of all things and any kind of origin to values, but also 
the referring back of these values to something which is, as it 
were, their origin and determines their value. 
(NP p. 2) 
On the other hand, this critical philosophy of sense, which reads 
from everything a vsdue and reads from every value an evaluation, con-
siders the meaning of an utterance as the result of forces which take 
hold of it; that is, it treats all utterances as symptoms to be analyzed 
so that the forces present in it are uncovered. Hence it is also a semio-
logy and a symptomatology, and its tools are evaluation and interpreta-
tion. In its interpretations it seeks to know the "force which appro-
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priates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is 
expressed in it." (NP p. 3) This applies not only to things, but also to 
thoughts: 
Gradually it has become clear to me what every philosophy 
so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author 
and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the 
moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the 
real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown. 
Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical 
claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and 
wise) to ask: at what morality does all this (does he) aim? 
(BGE 6) 
In our delineation of Nietzsche's own way of thinking we will attempt to 
hold fast to this principle. 
Metaphysics, as it is tied to the Platonic image of thought, formu-
lates its question as a question of essence, in the form "What is . . . ?" 
(e.g., "What is knowledge?", "What is morality?") The Nietzschean critical 
philosophy, following the sophists' tradition, takes its question as 
"Which one?", for example, "Which one is capable of uttering it?" It 
means: "What are the forces which take hold of a giving thing, what is 
the will that possesses it? Which one is expressed, manifested and even 
hidden in it?" (NP p. 77) This is not the psychological question con-
cerning the motives or intentions of an utterance. It inquires after the 
type, the mode of existence of the utterer, the quality of forces that 
constitute the utterance; hence this critical philosophy is also a typo-
logy. (NP p. 75) 
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2. Affirmation and Negation 
To sum up, the critical philosophy has three forms: 
A symptomatology, since it interprets phenomena, treating them 
as symptoms whose sense must be sought in the forces that pro-
duces them. A typology, since it interprets forces from the 
standpoint of their quality, be it active or reactive. A genealogy, 
since it evaluates the origin of forces from the point of view of 
their nobility or baseness, since it discovers their ancestry in 
the will to power and the quality of this will. 
(NP p. 75) 
Good or bad, noble or base—at this point Deleuze refers us to The 
Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil: "There are master 
morality and slave morality-—! add immediately that in all the higher and 
more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between 
these two moralities, and yet more often the interpretation and mutual 
misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside 
each other even in the same human being, within a single soul. The 
moral discrimination of values has originated either along a ruling group 
whose consciousness of its difference from the ruled group was accom-
panied by delight—or among the ruled, the slaves and dependents of 
every degree." (BGE 260) Here Nietzsche is required to take his stand 
on the story of Master and Slave. How is the Master to be distinguished 
from the Slave? Not, for sure, by an appeal to facts. The Master is not 
necessarily the one who rules, and the Slaves not only those being 
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ruled. Totalitarian regimes are regimes of slaves, not only because of 
the people they subjugate, but above all because of the type of 
"master" they set up. (NP p. x) 
Just as Master and Slave do not correspond to the dominator and 
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the dominated, they are not distinguished by strength either. 
The weak are not characterized by the weakness of their desire 
for strength, like abortions of the will or ontological worms 
exercising their lamentable conatus. They are characterized by 
the strength of their desire for weakness. The weak may thus 
be the strongest from the point of view of efficacy, but would 
none the less continue to be weak by the negative orientation 
of their will, turned entirely towards self-annihilation/ 
The difference between Master and Slave lies not in strength but in 
the qualities of strength: a strength is active/noble/affirinative or re-
active/base/negative. The Master affirms himself and labels himself good; 
while the Slave resents the Master and calls him bad. The Slave's action 
is actually a reaction. Through this negative evaluation of the Master, 
he labels himself good. The Master says: "I am good, therefore you are 
evil", but the Slave says: "You are evil, therefore I am good." He needs 
"to conceive of a non-ego, then to oppose himself to this non-ego in 
order finally to posit himself as a self. This is the strange syllogism of 
the slave: he needs two negations in order to produce an appearance 
of affirmation." (NP p. 121) 
The Master delights in being who he is, affirming himself, labeling 
himself good without any need to compare himself with others. In the 
Master's premises everything is positive. He only then draws from these 
premises something negative as merely peripheral: "it seeks its opposite 
only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly~~its nega-
tive concepts 'low', 'common', •bad' is only a subsequently-invented pale, 
contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concepts—filled with 
life and passion through and through—*we noble ones, we good, beauti-
ful, happy ones!’" (GM p. 37) When the Master says "I am good, there-
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fore you are evil," these negative conclusiDns are only the results of 
active, aggressive actions. The Slave on the other hand, proceeds not 
from himself but others. He needs an Other, and it is only by negating, 
‘opposing himself to this Other that he is able to conceive of himself. 
"While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of 
itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside', what 
is 'different', what is 'not itself'; and this No is its creative deed. This 
inversion of the value-positing eye~this need to direct one's view out-
ward instead of back to oneselfis the essence of ressentiment; in 
order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; 
it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at 
allits action is fundamentally reaction." (GM pp. 36-37) The Hegelian 
Master is, hence, in that he needs to be recognized by others, a Slave. 
(NP p. 10) 
3. Active and Reactive 
Yet this distinction between affirmation and negation is not yet ade-
quate to distinguish the Master from the Slave since, as we can see 
from above, there is affirmation and negation both in the Master and 
the Slave. Deleuze seeks to refine this distinction by appealing to 
Nietzsche's idea of force: 
Nietzsche's philosophy is organized along two great axes. The 
first is concerned with force, with forces, and forms of general 
semiology. Phenomena, things, organisms, societies, consciousness 
and spirits are signs, or rather symptoms, and themselves re-
flect states of forces. This is the origin of the conception of the 
philosopher as "physiologist and physician". 
(NP p. X) 
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Forces differ from each other in terms of quantity and quality. From 
the point of view of quantity, forces are strong or weak; while the 
quality of forces are called "active" and "reactive". An active force 
commands, appropriates, and imposes forms on reactive forces (NP p. 42, 
cf. BGE 259 and WP 647). It "goes to the limit of its power" (NP p. 59). 
A reactive force, on the other hand, sets limit to itself and to the active 
force (NP p. 56), even when it obeys. What prevents Nietzsche's philo-
sophy of difference from becoming a dialectical thinking is that he in-
sists on a categorical distinction between quantity and quality. However, 
he also insists that the quality of forces corresponds to their difference 
in quantity. "The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense: 
what appears is that the one accompanies the other, an analogy” (WP 
564). If the relation between the quantity and the quality of forces is 
analogical, how can Nietzsche prevent the simple integration of the 
active into the strong, and the reactive into the weak? Does the dis-
tinction between active and reactive. Master and Slave, has to, in the 
last resort, appeal to a factual, qualitative distinction between strong 
and weak? 
Deleuze contends that we come across these difficulties because we 
misunderstand Nietzsche's intention: "In short, Nietzsche is never in-
terested in the irreducibility of quantity to quality; or rather he is in-
terested in it secondarily and as a symptom. What interests him primari-
ly, from the standpoint of quantity itself, is the fact that difference in 
quantity cannot be reduced to equality. Quality is distinct from quantity 
but only because it is that aspect of quantity that cannot be equalized, 
that cannot be equalized out in the difference between quantities. Dif-
ference in quantity is therefore, in one sense, the irreducible element 
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of quantity and in another sense the element which is irreducible to 
quantity itself. Quality is nothing but difference in quantity and cor-
responds to it each time forces enter into relation." (NP pp. 43-44) For 
Nietzsche the quantity of a force is inseparable from the difference in 
quantity, and every force is in a relationship of difference with other 
forces. "Difference in quantity is the essence of force and of the re-
lation of force to force." (NP p. 43) The extent to which the quantity of 
a force corresponds to its quality is dependent on one further determi-
nation. This determination is the character of the will that expresses it-
self in the force, the will to power. "The victorious concept 'force' . . . 
still needs to be qompleted: an inner will must be ascribed to it; which 
I designate as 'will to power'." (WP 619) According to Deleuze, the will 
to power is "the genealogical element of force, both differential and 
genetic. The will to power is the element from which derive both the 
qualitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves 
into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its 
nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces." (NP p. 50) The rela-
tion between forces is determined in the first place by their active and 
reactive quality, and in the second by the affinity of this quality for 
the corresponding pole of the will to power (affirmative or negative): 
"active and reactive designate the original qualities of force but affirm-
ative and negative designate the primordial qualities of the will to 
power." (NP pp. 53-54) 
The will to power is differentiated into the affirmative and the nega-
tive. The affirmative will to power affirms its difference as difference, 
whereas the negative will to power affirms by negating, that is, by 
affirming himself as what the other is not. "Master" is Nietzsche's name 
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for the active, affirmative forces in man, and "Slave" the reactive, 
negative ones. Now we come back to our question: How is the affirmation 
and negation of the Master to be distinguished from those of the Slave? 
The answer that we are looking for lies in the distinction between dif-
ference and oppositijon. 
If we understand affirmation and negation as qualities of the will 
to power we see that they do not have a univocal relation. Nega-
tion is opposed to affirmation but affirmation differs from nega-
tion. We cannot think of affirmation as 'being opposed' to nega-
tion: this would be to place the negative within it. Opposition is 
not only the relation negation with affirmation but the essence 
of the negative as such. Affirmation is the enjoyment and play 
of its own difference, just as negation is the suffering and 
labour of the opposition that belongs to it. 
(NP pp. 188-189) 
The Slave opposes the Master, He is competitive and sees all difference 
as opposition. The Master on the other hand, with his sovereign affirm-
ation, perceives no opposition where there is difference; and in his dif-
ference from others he "derives a satisfaction which he does not feel 
to be threatened by the opinion or the existence of other men who are 
not like him."^ This is why the dialectic is the thinking of the Slave: 
it produces a slavish image of difference: "The Hegelian dialectic is 
indeed a reflection on difference, but it inverts its image. For the 
affirmation of difference as such it substitutes the negation of that 
which differs; for the affirmation of self it substitutes the negation of 
the other, and for the affirmation of affirmation it substitutes the 
negation of negation." (NP p. 196) 
Is this criterion of difference vs. opposition an effective means for 
the separatiDn of Master and Slave? From the point of view of affirma-
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tion, Le., of the Master, the relation between affirmation and negation 
is difference, and not opposition, therefore he will never perceive nega-
tion as negative, as opposition. However, from the Slave's point of view, 
the Master's affirmation is opposition. He will never be able to see that 
the Master's negations are actually affirmations. As there is no external 
perspective from which the two points of view can be compared, there 
can be no relationship between Master and Slave. The worlds of Master 
and Slave will be separate, for they will never be able to recognize 
each other.4 There must be a way of separating the active forces from 
the reactive ones. Deleuze attempts to resolve this difficulty with an 
interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence:^ 
Of course one may ask in what sense and why noble is "worth 
more" than base or high "worth more" than low. By what right? 
There is no possible reply to this question if as we consider the 
will to power in itself or abstractly, as merely endowed with two 
opposite qualities, affirmation and negation. Why should affirm-
ation be better than negation? We will see that the solution can 
only be given by the test of eternal return: what is better and 
better absolutely is that which returns, or that which can bear 
returning, that which wills its return. 
(NP p. 86) 
4. The Eternal Return 
According to Nietzsche, the idea of eternal return came to him as a 
sudden revelation and a new vision, which overtook him in the summer 
of 1881: 
Now I shall relate the history of Zarathustra. The fundamental 
conception of this work, the idea of eternal recurrence, this 
highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs 
in August 1881: it was penned on a sheet with the notation 
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underneath, "6000 feet beyond man and time." That day I was 
walking through the woods along the lake of Silvaplana; at a 
powerful pyramidal rock not 'far from Surlei I stopped. It was 
then that this idea came to roe. 
("Thus Spoke Zarathustra; A Book for All and None", EH p. 295) 
The first written communicatLon of the idea appeared one year later 
in 1882, in a passage near the end of Book Four of the Gay Science 
(which L5 the end of the first edition of the book), passage 341, which 
reads: 
The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon 
were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to 
you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will 
have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there 
will be nothing new in it, but everything unutterably small or 
great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same 
succession and sequenceeven this spider and this moonlight 
between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The 
eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and 
again, and you with it, speck of dust!" 
Would you throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and 
curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced 
a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You 
are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this 
thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you 
are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every 
thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times 
more?" would lie upon your action as the greatest weight. Or 
how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to 
life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal? 
(GS 341) 
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"What if • • • ” the passage begins with the hypothetical tone that 
marks most of the presentations of the thought of eternal return.^ Here 
the thought is presented as, one may say, an ethical test (it asks: "Can 
you affirm this?"). It is said to have a great impact on the person who 
contemplates it ("it would change you as you are or perhaps crush 
you"). Yet it is not immediately clear how it can have such an impact. 
As the thought denies any interaction between cycles and any memory 
of past cycles, I can neither plan my actions in the present cycle 
according to my knowledge of past cycles nor try to affect future 
cycles with my actions. What consequence can there be of my thinking 
that whatever happens will happen again and again eternally, and that 
what happens now is only a repetition of what has happened in the last 
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cycleif whatever happens will happen again and again eternally, and 
what happens now is only a repetition of what has happened in the last 
cycle? Indeed it seems to make no difference whether I do a thing once 
or an infinite number of times, if each time is independent of the other, 
and each occasion is identical. On the other hand, if I do affirm the 
thought of return, isn't it precisely "because" I have already affirmed 
it in the countless cycles in the past? If I haven't already done so in 
the past cycles, how could I possibly do it now? 
Implicit in these questions is the understanding of the idea of 
return as the repetition of identical events. Thus understood, the 
doctrine of eternal return says that everything that has already 
happened, everything that is happening at this moment, and everything 
that is going to happen in the future , has already happened and will 
happen again, preceded and followed by exactly the same events in 
exactly the same order, in an infinite number of times. Each cycle is 
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completely identical with every other; in fact it would be more correct 
to say that there is only one cycle, repeated again and again ad 
infinitum. Hence, or so it seems, with the idea of eternal return, 
Nietzsche has bequeathed us with a kind of cyclical cosmology, which 
can be a test to the person who muses on it, yet the power of this test 
seems to be put into question by the idea of return itself. 
If this is what the doctrine amounts to, it is perplexing that Nie-
tzsche should place so much emphasis upon it. What role can such an 
idea play in the philosophy of sense and value? Before we, as many of 
Nietzsche's commentators have, dismiss the idea of eternal return as 
some kind of badly constructed cyclical cosmological hypothesis or fan-
tastic, fatalistic heroism, let us pause and ask ourselves: does Nietzsche 
really intend to convey some kind of cyclical view of the universe by 
his doctrine of eternal return? How, with all his criticisms and attacks 
on identity, substance and other forms of permanent endurance, can 
Nietzsche put forward a doctrine of the eternal return (or, better, re-
petition) of identical events? In order not to let this weightiest thought 
slip through our fingers so lightly, we must withhold all hasty judg-
ments and follow Deleuze patiently in his reading of Nietzsche, as he 
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attempts to find another way of understanding the doctrine of return 
besides simply as a cyclical cosmology. 
5. Eternal Return: The "Scientific Proof" of the Doctrine 
The so-called "cosmological version" of the doctrine of return is 
neatly summarized in The Will to Power, it is cited frequently by com-
mentators in support of an understanding of the doctrine of return as 
an cyclical hypothesis in cosmology:， 
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If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity 
of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force~ 
and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore 
uselessit follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it 
must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infi-
nite time, every possible combination would at some time be rea-
lized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And 
since between every combination and its next recurrence all 
other possible combinations would have to take place, and each 
of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of com-
binations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely 
identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular 
movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and • 
plays its game in infinitum. 
(WP 1066) 
This so-called "scientific presentation" of the doctrine seems to 
invite an mechanistic interpretation of it, but Nietzsche immediately 
warns us against this approach: "This conception is not simply a me-
chanistic conception; for if it were that, it would not condition an 
infinite recurrence of identical cases, but a final state. Because the 
world has not reached this, mechanistic theory must be considered an 
imperfect and merely provisional hypothesis." (ibid.) Hence the doctrine 
of return not only refuses a mechanistic interpretation, it stands op-
posed to mechanism in its rejection of the idea of a final state. Besides 
nineteenth century mechanism the other target is obviously teleology 
(i.e., the teleological conception of the universe): "The old habit • • • of 
associating a goal with every event and a guiding, creative God with 
the world, is so powerful that it requires an effort for a thinker not to 
fall into thinking of the very aimlessness of the world as intended." (WP 
1062) Also WP 55: "existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet re-
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curring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: 'the eternal re-
currence'. . . . W e deny end goals: if existence had one it would have 
to have been reached." 
One thing about this presentation immediately catches our attention: 
if it is intended as a proof of the doctrine, it is packed with flaws and 
unwarranted assumptions. Take the first two for example: 
(1) The world is a finite quantity of forces; 
(2) The forces are distributed into a finite number of centers of 
forces. 
Nietzsche seems to think that the first assumption entails the second. 
Yet this is not as self-evident as it might seem. For example, the sum 
of the series 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + . . . is finite, yet there are in-
finitely many members in the series. For argument's sake let us assume 
that both assumptions are granted. Yet it does not follow that there will 
be a finite number of combinations of forces. Georg Simmel has given a 
classical counterexample to this conclusion: imagine three wheels rotating 
on an axle. A ruler is put across the wheels and a line is drawn so that 
there is a mark on each of the edges of the wheels. Initially, before the 
wheels begin to rotate, the three marks will lie together forming a 
straight line. Now the wheels begin to rotate, at a speed of n, n/2 and 
n/x respectively. It is clear that the initial combination, with the three 
marks on the same line, will never occur again. One might in Nietzsche's 
defence object that Nietzsche is talking about totally random combina-
tions. This will bring us to another problem in the cosmological version 
of the doctrine of return: If the combinations are at random, then 
between one combination and its recurrence there will be many other 
combinations, the number of which is unpredictable and their pattern, 
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which should have been cyclical, will be completely irregular. What's 
more, Nietzsche has given no explanation for why an initial combination 
will determine the entire development of the universe in the cycle. 
Perhaps these are the reasons that prevent Nietzsche from publish-
ing any "proof" of the doctrine during his lifetime. On the other hand 
we may ask: does Nietzsche really mean to prove the doctrine in a sci-
entific manner? Does he consider it to be an empirical hypothesis? In 
WP 55 he uses the phrase "the most scientific of all possible hypo-
Q 
theses", and the plan of the book on eternal recurrence (WP 1057) con-
tains a "proof of the doctrine". Yet we must not forget Nietzsche's 
critical stance towards science (See, for example, BGE 14 and 208; cf. NP 
pp. 44-46) and the fact that he has shown no intention to commit him-
self to its concepts and assumptions. We sum up this discussion with a 
passage from the Gay Science: 
Let us beware of positing generally and everywhere anything as 
elegant as the cyclical movements of our neighboring stars. 
(GS 109) 
6. The Doctrine of Return as Selective Thought 
Against the common understanding of the eternal return as the re-
petition of identical events, Deleuze proposes the bold interpretation of 
eternal return as selective principle. To see how it can have such a 
function, we will begin with Nietzsche's view of history as the triumph 
of reactive forces and negative will to power, which he calls the ad-
vance of nihilism. Thus understood, the problem for Nietzsche is to find 
out how the reactive forces managed to conquer active forces and to 
determine the means whereby the reactive forces can be overcome. 




How do reactive forces triumph? Do they get the better of active 
forces by getting together, forming a greater force which would then 
be active, dominant, aggressive and subjugating? Nietzsche's answer is 
that even by getting together reactive forces do not form a greater, 
active force. (NP p. 57) "They proceed in an entirely different way— 
they decompose; they separate active force from what it can do; they 
take away a part or almost all of its power. In this way reactive forces 
do not become active but, on the contrary, they make active forces join 
them and become reactive in a new sense." (ibid.) The active forces be-
come reactive "in a new sense" because the active forces are now sepa-
rated from what they can do while in the old sense the reactive forces 
set limits to what they themselves can do: "an active force becomes 
reactive (in a new sense) when reactive forces (in the first sense) 
separate it from what it can do." (ibid.) This can be illustrated by the 
case of bad conscience: when the Slave, the reactive man, is over-
powered by the Master, he does not seek revenge by fighting back. 
Rather he retaliates by invoking the bad conscience of the Master, and 
makes him regret and feel guilty for what he has done, thus stopping 
him from doing it (i.e” from being Master) and turns him into a Slave 
like himself. When an active force is separated from going "to the limits 
of its power" (NP p. 59), it becomes reactive. Thus there are four dif-
ferent kinds of force: 
1) active force, power of acting or commanding; 2) reactive 
force, power of obeying or being acted; 3) developed reactive 
force, power of splitting up, dividing and separating; 4) active 
force become reactive, power of being separated, of turning 
against itself. 
(NP p. 63) 
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History, for Nietzsche, is the triumph of reactive forces, the advance 
of nihilism: "nihilism is not an event in history but the motor of history 
of man as universal history." (NP p. 152) Deleuze distinguishes three 
phrases in the development of nihilism.^  The story begins with negative 
nihilism, where the value of life is negated, is depreciated by means of 
the fiLction of a supersensible, "real" world. Life becomes unreal, and is 
considered as appearance: "Nihil in 'nihilism' means negation as quality 
of the will to power. Thus, in its primary and basic sense, nihilism sig-
nifies the value of nil taken on by life, the fLction of higher values 
which give it this value and the will to nothingness which is expressed 
in these higher values." (NP p. 147) The second phase, reactive nihiJisni, 
is marked not by a will but by a reaction. It is the ideas of super-
sensible world and higher values that are reacted against. The fictLons 
which were employed in the devaluation of life are themselves deva-
luated. "Devaluation no longer signifies life taking on the value of nil, 
the null value, but the nullity of values, of higher values. • • • Thus 
the nihilist denies God, the good and even truth一all forms of the su-
persensible. Nothing is true, nothing is -good, God is dead." (NP p. 148) 
This is succeeded by a third phase, passive nihilism, where the "ex-
hausted life • • • prefers to not will, to fade away passively, rather than 
being animated by a will which goes beyond it." (NP p. 151) 
Is the triumph of nihilism inevitable? Is man essentially reactive? 
Nietzsche considers the triumph of reactive forces as something essen-
tial to man and history: "Ressentiment and bad conscience are consti-
tutive of the humanity of man, nihilism is the a priori concept of uni-
versal history." (NP p. 166) Yet he also admits the possiblity of the 
existence of the type of the Master: "Nietzsche speaks of the masters 
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as a type of human being that the slave has merely conquered, of cul-
ture as a human species activity that reactive forces have simply di-
verted from its course, of the free and sovereign individual as the 
human product of this activity that the reactive man has only de-
formed." (NP p. 167) 
How is it possible for there to be Masters if man is essentially re-
active? How is the overcoming of nihilism possible? Deleuze answers in 
Nietzsche's place that it is not man's essence that is reactive in the 
sense that there is something that is called "Man's being" and this 
"man's being" is reactive. Man is his becoming and this becoming is a 
becoming -reactive: 
To the question "is man essentially reactive?" we must reply 
that what constitutes man is still deeper. What constitutes man 
and his world is not only a particular type of force, but a mode 
of becoming of forces in general, not reactive forces in parti-
cular, but the becoming -reactive of all forces. • • • In this way 
Nietzsche reconciles the two aspects of the higher man, his re-
active and his active character. At first sight men's activity 
appears to be generic; reactive forces are grafted onto it, per-
verting it and diverting it from its course. But more deeply, 
what is truly generic is the becoming reactive of all forces, 
activity being only the particular term presupposed by this 
becoming. 
(NP p. 167) 
In opposition to man's becoming -reactive, Nietzsche attempts with the 
idea of eternal return to produce the becoming -active in man. As he ob-
serves in The Will to Power, the existent nihilism is an "incomplete nihi-
lism". This incomplete nihilism expresses not only a negative will (the 
will to nothingness) but also a will to preserve itself. Only the thought 
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of eternal return can "complete" this nihilism in that it brings the 
latter*s "devaluation of value" to its completion so that the value of 
self-preservation is also devaluated. 
We have seen that the idea of eternal return can be formulated as 
an "ethical test" (as it is in the Gay Science). As ethical doctrine, it 
functions as a selective principle in the form of a practical rule: “ what-
ever you will, will it in a way that you also will its eternal return." (NP 
p. 68) or in Nietzsche's words: "If, in all that you will you begin by 
asking yourself: is it certain that I will do it an infinite number of 
times? This should be your most solid centre of gravity."^® This under-
standing of the thought of the eternal return, which Nietzsche calls 
"the great selective thought" (WP 1053, 1056), will eliminate all the half-
willings and hesitant yearnings: "Laziness, stupidity, baseness, coward-
ice or spitefulness that would wiU its eternal return would no longer be 
the same laziness, stupidity, etc. How does the eternal return perform 
the selection here? It is the thought of the eternal return that selects. 
It makes willing something whole." (NP p. 69) 
However, the idea of eternal return as an ethical thought cannot 
completely eliminate the reactive forces. The will to nothingness, the 
negative will can withstand this selection, for it can will the eternal 
return of its negativity (NP p. 69). Hence a second selection is needed. 
This is the idea of eternal return not as selective thought but as se-
lective ontology. This second selection is very different from the first. 
It is no longer a question of the thought of eternal return eliminating 
from willing everything that falls outside it but rather, of the eternal 
return making something come into being. It is no longer a question of 
selective thought but of selective being. This understanding of the 
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eternal return as selective ontology, according to Deleuze, "involves the 
most obscure parts of Nietzsche's philosophy and forms an almost eso-
teric element on the doctrine of the eternal return." (NP p. 69) He sums 
up his interpretation as follows: 
The second selection in the eternal return is thus the following： 
the eternal return produces becoming -active. It is sufficient to 
relate the will to nothingness to the eternal return in order to 
realize that reactive forces do not return. However far they go, 
however deep the becoming-reactive of forces, reactive forces 
will not return. The small, petty, reactive man will not return. 
• . • This is what Nietzsche presents as Zarathustra's cure and 
Dionysus' secret. "Nihilism vanishes by itself" thanks to the 
eternal return. 
(NP p. 71) 
Even if the doctrine of eternal return is taken as a selective 
thought, it still leaves open a gap between what deserves to return and 
what actually does, if everything—deserving or notreturns. It is this 
idea that provokes the disgust of Zarathustra: "Alas, man recurs eter-
nally! The little man recurs eternally!" (’,The Convalescent", TSZ p. 236) 
According to the idea of eternal return as selective ontology, eternal 
return eliminates the slavish, leaving only the strong to return. What-
ever is unable to bear to weight of the thought of return is suppressed 
by the selection of eternal return: "the eternal return would be con-
tradictory if it were the return of reactive forces. The eternal return 
teaches us that becoming -reactive has no being. Indeed, it also teaches 
us of the existence of a becoming-active. It necessarily produces be-
coming-active by reproducing becoming." (NP p. 72) 
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7. Recapitulation . 
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's philosophy is organized along two 
great axes. "The first is concerned with force, with forces, and forms 
• 0 
of general semiology." (NP p. x) Forces are what constitute the sense 
of something. They are of two qualities, active and reactive. Active 
forces are dominant and go to the limit of what they can do. Reactive 
forces are dominated and seek to separate active forces from what they 
can do. (NP pp. 56, 59-61) The second axis is concerned with power, on 
which the value of something depends: "If it is true that all things 
reflect a state of forces then power designates the element, or rather 
the differential relationship, of forces which directly confront one 
another." (NP p. xi) Two primordial qualities are ascribed to the will to 
power: affirmation and negation, (ibid.) Affirmation is the power of 
becoming active, while negation is becoming reactive (NP p. 54). The 
Mastery, active forces affirm their difference from reactive forces; while 
the Slavish, reactive forces affirm themselves by negating, by opposing 
to the Masters. "You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's 
fundamental formula. • • . This formula must be compared to that of the 
master: I am good, therefore you are evil" What separates the Master 
from the Slave is the difference between affirmation and opposition: 
Negation is opposed to affirmation but affirmation differs from 
negation. We cannot think of affirmation as •being opposed* to 
negation: this would be to place the negative within it. Opposi-
tion is not only the relation negation with affirmation but the 
essence of the negative as such. Affirmation is the enjoyment 
and play of its own difference, just as negation is the suffering 
and labour of the opposition that belongs to it. 
(NP pp. 188-189) 
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For Nietzsche, human history is the triumph of the Slave, the pre-
vailing of reactive forces. A kind of post-history is reached when the 
reactive forces are eliminated by the test of eternal return. Under the 
selection of the eternal return, only the strong, those who "affirm their 
difference", will return. They come back, but differently; whereas the 
weak, those who "negate that which differs" are annihilated. There is 
thus a kind of "auto-destruction of the negative" in the eternal return, 
which functions both as a selective thought and a selective ontology. 
This is, briefly, Deleuze's presentation of Nietzsche's "general 
project". What does this philosophy accomplish? According to Deleuze, 
this "philosophy of sense and value" is a critique, for it unmasks the 
fictions and mystifLcatLons that reactive forces employ in order to pre-
vail over active forces: 
Philosophy is at its most positive as critique, as an enterprise 
of demystification. 
(NP p. 106) 
In comparision to Nietzsche's idea of critique, what Kant's critical philo-
sophy lacks is an analysis of "the genesis of reason itself", of "the will 
which hides and expresses itself in reason." (NP p. 91) Instead of ask-
ing "what is truth?" Nietzsche asks about the will to truth: 
The will to truth which will still tempt us to many a venture, 
that famous truthfulness of which all philosophers so far have 
spoken with respectwhat questions has this will to truth not 
laid before us! • • • What in us really wants "truth"? 
(BGE 1) 
Nietzsche finds that what the one who seeks truth wants is not to 
be fooled. He who wills the truth considers this world as deceptive, as 
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a world of "appearance"; and to this world of appearance he opposes 
another world, a world beyond, a truthful world. Thus, behind this will 
to truth, Nietzsche discovers a negating, nihilistic will. He attempts to 
replace this negative will to truth will with an affirmative, creative will. 
The kind of thought that belongs with this will will be a thought "that 
would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life. Life 
would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the affirm-
ative power of life. • • • Thinking would then mean discovering, invent-
ing, new possibilities of life•“ (NP p. 101) 
According to Deleuze, this way of thinking will bring about a new 
image of thought that is antithetical to the traditional, dogmatic image 
of thought. The traditional image of thought can be summarized in three 
theses: (1) What qualifies the thinker as thinker is his love for truth, 
which is conceived as an abstract universal; and (2) the thinker is di-
verted from truth by forces foreign to it (body, passions, sensuous 
interests), error is the effect of forces external to thought (cf. Des-
cartes' treatment of error); (3) in order to think truthfully, in order to 
avoid error, what we need is a method. "Method is an artifice but one 
through which we are brought back to the nature of thought, through 
which we adnere to this nature and ward off the effect of the alien 
forces whcdh alter it and distract us. Through method we ward off 
error." (NP p. 103) In the new image of thought, the element of such a 
thought is not truth but sense and value. The categories of thought are 
not truth and falsity but "the noble and the base, the high and the 
low, depending on the nature of the forces that take hold of that 
thought." (NP p. 104) Secondly, the enemy of such a thought is not 
error (a force external to thought which diverts it from its right 
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course) but stupidity, a base way of thinking. (NP p. 105) 
In short, the new image of thought implied by Nietzsche's critique 
turns thinking into an interpretation and evaluation. The elements of 
this thinking is not truth and falsity but sense and value. The aim of 
his critique is not justifiLcatLon but a different way of feeling, "another 
% 
sensibility": "To think is to create： this is Nietzsche's greatest lesson. 
To think, to cast the dice • • •: this was already the sense of the eter-
nal return." (NP p. xiv) 
Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: 
they say, "thus it shall Be!" • • • Their "knowing" is creating, 
their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to 
power. 
Are there such philosophers today? Have there been such 
philosophers yet? Must there not be such philosophers?— 
(BGE 211) 
. 广 • • 
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Notes 
1. Vincent Descombes, Modem French Philosophy, tr. L. Scott-Fox & 
j.M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 156. 
2. Ibid., p. 160. 
3. Ibid., p. 163. 
4. Ibid., pp. 163-165. 
5. Besides the expression "eternal recurrence" (die ewige Wiederkehr), 
Nietzsche also speaks of "the eternal return" (die ewige Wie-
derkunft). As no systematic distinction can be found in his texts, we 
will consider the terms interchangeable. 
6. Even the so-called "scientific presentation" of the thought in WP 
1066 begins with "If the world may be thought of as a determinate 
quantity of force . . •"• 
7. A exemplary interpretation in this aproach is that offered by Arthur 
Danto. Danto contends that with the addition of "certain plausible 
premises", the hypothesis can be demonstrated to work. See Danto, 
"The Eternal Recurrence" in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. Robert Solomon (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973). 
8. The whole paragraph reads: "The European form of Buddhism： the 
energy of knowledge and strength compels this belief [the eternal 
return]. It is the most scientific of all possible hypotheses. We deny 
end goals: If existence had one it would have to have been 
reached." The elucidation of the doctrine in this section stresses its 
opposition to the idea of a final goal. Hence it may well be that 
Nietzsche thinks that the doctrine is "most scientific" in that it is 
against a teleological conception of the universe. 
9. Cf. Nietzsche's "How the •Real World' at last Became a Myth" in TI, 
pp. 40-41. 
10. Quoted from NP p. 68. This aphorism is included in the French 
edition of La Volonte de Puissance, translated by G. Bianquis from 
47 
. . . . - . 
！;《4>?』/;>絲力 . . � .... 
hi ^ . i 
UpV,. ‘ the edition of F. Wurzbach, but is not included in Kaufmann's 
丨::J … 广 editiDH. I, • … i 
’ - * 
I ^ ' . •, 
, ‘ • . . . . . . . . ‘ ‘ . 丨 .. 
. .'.:.... i Li I « ？�^；? - ^ ‘ , ‘ � . - , 
‘ . . • 一 1 � • , . . .… ‘ • •  •, 
• . . I , • . 《 
. . 
. \ . • . ..: � � . ’ ； • 
- Z , ‘ • 
- • 
/ . ， • 
‘ - . ‘ , > • • 
• ‘ Z 
’ “ • I 
• • 
. - • ‘� 
“ - . • 
• • 
_ . . 二 • 
； • . . . 
- • ~ 
- I ;, … 
‘ ^ ： . • • ‘ 
, - . ‘ • ‘ • 
.N； -‘. . 
� 
• _ ‘ 
‘ . � -
• » 
• , . ‘ , _ •冊 垂 
. ‘ • , ‘ . 
, • ‘ 
• • , ‘ 
,. .. .�. �—— . 
. - ^ 、. ； •‘ . . , . ： 
、 、 . • - . . . ' • 、 • f - • , . 
. . . • , . • . , “ - - . . , … 
• . . 
• • • 、 ‘ • 、 ^ • . . 
: : ‘ . . . . . . • ‘.• , , • . . • 
- . ： •• . . . . 、 . ' . • ‘ . . . . • . . 
.•+••• V ••••. ..i,•?•..’• .' . . . . . . -. . • , ‘ 
‘ ...•:• ： •. _ . . . . . 
t 如 丄 I < • • ‘ ‘ _ � % . '"J . ,, • ‘ . •  ‘ � . , . • •. . • 
r /I 4 一 •• 
I t ' / f -^TV V -l V - , . . . . . . . . I . • 
【 ' W r / ^ " ^ , . . ^ - ... 
i ’ ’ . � ， , . . \ . • •�.. � : •  … . . . . . . . . - ‘ 
If..-,' •'：.£• 'k •, 'V.；. ‘ '.-T .s",.... - .'.'i-ii t-> .f’.）.':i':v-. ., ‘ ..‘..，. /.J 1 ‘ . 'i - , , , . . . -
it ^ , ^ ‘‘ 'I J ^ 5 .. . .. • . • •• +.. • • • 48 ‘ -
liift辑⑶iff;:'，: V：;- — r … ： ； ： . V ： 
Part II 
Thinking After Nietzsche 




1. Masters and Slaves, Again 
In the previous chapter we have given a brief account of Deleuze*s 
interpretation of Nietzsche as it is presented in his Nietzsche and Philo-
sophy. Now we will be concerned with a critical review—an evaluation— 
of this "philosophy of sense and value". 
What does this philosophy accomplish? According to Deleuze, this 
"philosophy of sense and value" is a critique, for it unmasks the fic-
tions and mystifications that reactive forces employ in order to prevail 
over active forces: 
Philosophy is at its most positive as critique, as an enterprise 
of demystifiication. 
(NP p. 106) 
This characterization of Nietzsche's task is indeed surprising, for this 
seems to be what traditional philosophers have been doing or trying to 
do all along. What makes Nietzsche, as he is presented by Deleuze, think 
that he is doing something different? What makes him someone other 
than just another traditional philosopher claiming his progress against 
his predecessors? In what way is his thinking "untraditional"? Hugh 
Tomlinson sums up these criticisms neatly: 
Despite the "aggression against traditional philosophy", Deleuze's 
Nietzsche seems to be engaged in the most traditional of philoso-
phical projects: the unmasking of illusion. The old philosophy is 
attacked as insufficiently critical/ for not referring us to "the 
real forces that forms thought"—as if the "new thought" will be 
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able to be "more accurate". Deleuze appears to ignore the re_ 
flexive-selfawareness that is constitutive of Nietzsche's text's, 
while he uses the philosophical ruins it leaves behind to recon-
struct, in Nietzsche's name, an old-fashioned philosophical 
system.^ 
What's more, the trouble with this idea of critique is that, according 
to its own standard, the very idea of a critique seems to be a slavish 
one. For why would the Master want to affirm his difference from the 
Slave, and who but the Slave would want to be distinguished from the 
other? This challenge is put forward by Vincent Descombes in his 
Modern French Philosophy. Deleuze, in his version of the story of 
Master and Slave, tries to avoid the strictures of perspectivism by the 
self-validation of the position of the noble, the Master. "The noble eva-
luation derives from itself, out of the richness of being, whilst the base 
evaluation derives from its own indigence relative to the superiority it 
recognizes and covets in another."^ However, Descombes argues, this 
will not work. In order that the Master's evaluation, Le, his affirmation 
of his difference, be possible, it must be possible to conceive of an eva-
luation of the Master that is not competitive. In contrast to the Slave, 
the Master does not derive his affirmation from a comparison with the 
Slave, for he is never in opposition with him. The Master must be able 
to say "I am good," before he can say "I am good, therefore you are 
bad." But if this is the case, if the Master's affirmation of himself does 
not involve a relation with the other, then we should not say that "the 
Master affirms his difference" but rather that "he affirms his identity". 
However, Deleuze insists that the Master must on no account affirm his 
identity, otherwise difference (that between himself and the other) 
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would succeed identity and be subordinated to it. This will make their 
relation a hierarchy rather than an anarchy (an-arche, without a first 
principle), "a sedentary distribution of the Platonic kind rather than a 
nomadic distribution of the Deleuzian kind."^ Deleuze's Master, in de-
fining himself in terms of a relation of difference, is drawn into a 
"becoming-reactive", and the whole project of critique turns out to be 
a slavish one： 
The Master spends the bulk of his time "affirming his differ-
ence", distinguishing himself from the Slave. In the same way, 
affirmative philosophy is defined by negative undertakings, such 
as the attack against high priests or the demystificatijon of the 
people. 
Descombes concludes that in the end Deleuze's version of the story of 
the Master and Slave becomes "confused • • • with the Hegelian account, 
except in so far as everything which Hegel thought of as progress is 
now read as a symptom of decline."^ 
The active man is that young, strong, handsome man, whose face 
betrays the discreet signs of sickness to which he has not yet 
succumbed, of a contagion which will only affect him tomorrow. 
The strong must be defended against the weak, but we know the 
desperate character of this enterprise. The strong man can op-
pose the weak, but not his own becoming-weak, which is bound 
to him by a subtle attraction. Each time that Nietzsche speaks 
of the active men, he does so with the sadness of seeing the 
destiny to which they are predetermined as their essential 
becoming: the Greek world overthrown by the theoretical man, 
Rome overthrown by J u d e a . . . . 
(NP p. 167) 
What can Deleuze say in reply to these criticisms? Can he resolve 
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these difficulties? Or must he conclude that Nietzsche (and he himself) 
has failed in his attempt to go beyond metaphysics, to think otherwise 
than traditional philosophy? Must he admit that he has only produced 
an inverted version of Hegelianism? In his essay on Deleuze and the 
problem of reflexivity Hugh Tomlinson suggests that these problems 
must be approached indirectly.^ Of this we have Deleuze's own words 
in support: 
Every time someone puts an objection to me, I want to say: "OK, 
OK, let's go on to something else." Objections have never contri-
buted anything. It's the same when I am asked a general ques-
tion. The aim is not to answer questions' it's to get out' to get 
out of it. Many people think that it is only by going back over 
the question that it's possible to get out of it. "What is the 
posLtion with philosophy? Is it dead? Are we going beyond it?" 
It's very trying. They won't stop returning to the question in 
order to get out of it. But getting out never happens like that. 
Movement always happens behind the thinker's back, or in the 
moment when he blinks. 
(D p. 1) 
Thus our task here is to see how Deleuze got out of these questions' 
to trail patiently his lines of escape. • • • 
Ten years after the publication of Nietzsche and Philosophy, at a 
conference at Cerisy-la-Saile entitled "Nietzsche aujourd'hui?", Deleuze 
offered us another discussion on Nietzsche. In this essay entitled 
"Nomad Thought" Deleuze no longer speaks of Nietzsche's "critical philo-
sophy"; instead of Kant the names of Freud and Marx are evoked in 
comparison to Nietzsche. For many, the names of the three represent the 
dawn of modern culture. Conceivably, Marx and Freud do represent the 
advent of our modern culture, but the case with Nietzsche is entirely 
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different. What he represents, if he does represent something, is the 
dawn of "counterculture". (NT p. 143) 
Traditional metaphysics is always concerned with the establishment 
of a hierarchy in which places and ranks are appointed to beings. This 
hierarchy is set up by invoking a First Principle (Le., an arche), under 
which all beings are subsumed. Identity and reality are conferred to 
each member via this Principle: participation, imitation, semblance, etc. 
Despite their revolutionary outlook, Marxism and Freudianism fulfill 
similar tasks. They are attempts at codificatiDn—or rather, recodifiL-
cation, the recodification of what has become decodifijed and ambiguous 
in the rise of modern culture.^ Marxist recodification operates by the 
code of the State: '"You have been made ill by the state, and you will 
be cured by the state* —but not the same state"; and in the case of 
Freudianism it is recodification by the Family: "'You have been made ill 
by the family, and you will be cured by the family"一but not the same 
family". (NT p. 142) These two forms of recodification—one public, the 
other privatehave become t h � fundamental bureaucracies (bureaucra-
cies in the ordinary sense and also in the sense that we speak of "aca-
demic" and "intellectual" bureaucracies) in modern culture. Nietzsche, 
on the other hand, is doing something entirely different. 
Confronted with the ways in which our societies become pro-
gressively decodified and unregulated, in which our codes break 
down at every point, Nietzsche is the only thinker who makes no 
attempt at recodification. 
(NT p. 143) 
With his thinking and writings Nietzsche attempts to do something 
other than those done by thinkers before him. Not just another philo-
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sophy, not just one step forward in the history of philosophy, but some 
other thing, a kind of "philosophy" that refuses to be classified, codi-
fifid, and subsumed in the same history. 
In his own writing and thought Nietzsche assists in the attempt 
at decodifijcation—not in the relative sense, by deciphering 
former, present, or future codes, but in an absolute sense, by 
expressing something that can not be codified, confounding all 
codes. 
• (NT p. 143) 
» 
Instead of the philosopher of sense and value, Nietzsche is now pre-
sented by Deleuze, along with Lucretius, Spinoza and Bergson, as one 
of the "writers who seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but 
also escaped from it in one respect, or altogether" (D pp. 14-15), as a 
figure on the margins of philosophy. The "and" in "Nietzsche and philo-
sophy" now comes to the fore. In this new discussion of Nietzsche as 
well as Deleuze's other works in the same period {such as the colla-
borative works with Felix Guattari), the dualisms of active and reactive, 
affirmation and negation. Master and Slave are now replaced by the new 
ones: decodification and recodification, deterritorialisation and reterri-
orialisatijon, nomadic and sedentary. Dazzled by these new terminologies, 
we couldn't help wondering: is Deleuze simply repeating himself and 
—more crucially—repeating the dualisms of metaphysics (Being and 
Becoming, reality and appearancein short, the "good" and the "bad") 
with some faddish, fancy labels? didn't Nietzsche say that "the funda-
mental faith of metaphysics is the faith in opposite values"? (BGE 2) Or 
is Deleuze, as he says of Nietzsche, doing something "entirely dif-
ferent"? 
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2. Dualisms and "Dualisms" 
In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
characterize their work with the images of rhizome and tree. There are 
two types of books. The first is the root-book, which takes the root and 
the tree as its models. The tree is already the image of the world, and 
the root-book seeks to imitate the world. This image of the book always 
involves a First Principle, just as the roots are always referred back 
to the unity of the trunk. The kind of thinking and writing that take 
the tree as its image works under the principle of tracing: "All of tree 
logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction. • • • Its goal is to describe 
a de facto state. • . • The tree articulates and hierarchizes tracing; 
tracings are like the leaves of a tree." (TP pp. 5, 12) The tree and root • 
inspire an image of thought that imitates the multiple on the basis of 
a centered higher unity. The other kind of thinking and writing takes 
the rhizome as its image. The rhizome has no origin, nor does it have 
an aim. It has no unifying principle, it grows in all directions: "any 
point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, it must be. This 
is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an 
order." (TP p. 7) It is a map, not a tracing: "The map is open and con-
nectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, suspectable 
to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind 
of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It 
can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as 
a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps the most important char-
acteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entry ways; in 
this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a 
clear distinction between the line of flight as passageway and storage 
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or living strata (cf. the muskrat). A map has multiple entry ways, as 
opposed to the tracing, which always comes back，to the same." (TP p. 
12) At this point Deleuze and Guattari themselves raise the questbn: 
"Have we not, however, reverted to a simple dualism by contrasting 
maps to tracings, as good and bad sides?" Is not the dualism of rhi-
zome-tree itself a binary, tree-like distinction? Yet, if we look at the 
images of tree and rhizome closely, we will find that their relation is 
not as straightforward as it seems. We can find tree or root structure 
in the rhizome, and a root can also burgeon into rhizomes. Thus the 
dualisms break down into a complex of overlapping and interconnecting 
terms, escaping the "either • . • or • • • " logic of traditional meta-
physics. So what is the point in constructing these dualisms which ac-
cording to traditional standards cannot even sustain? For Deleuze and 
Guattari these dualisms fulfil a strategic function: 
We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We 
employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process 
which would challenge all models. It is up to the reader to have 
cerebral correctors which undo the dualisms that we have not 
wished to draw, but by which nevertheless we travel. It is up 
to the reader to arrive at the magical formula which we all seek： 
PLURALISM=MONISM, by passing through all the dualisms which 
are the enemy, the altogether necessary enemy, the furniture 
0 
which we endlessly shift around. 
This is how Deleuze and Guattari account for the status and purpose of 
their own discourse. Although dualisms cannot be abolished, they can 
be undermined by using other dualisms. These "other dualisms" differ 
from those of the traditional kind in that they are proliferative, growing 




hypostatized into a fixed, sedentary dualism. 
These claims immediately invite suspicion: how can Deleuze and Gua-
ttari simply make up things such as their dualisms? Aren't they sup-
posed to produce theories that are "true" or representations of reality • 
that are "accurate"? 
In an interview with Michel Foucault, Deleuze explains his conception 
of a theory: "A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to 
do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function."^ Tomlinson 
suggests that we can, following Lyotard, term these "theories" as "nar-
ratives".^ ^ A narrative still seeks to explain, that is, it still aims at an 
understanding of the phenomenon studied. But unlike theories in the 
traditional sense, a narrative does not claim to be final or definitive. It 
is an "explanation that works by redescribing events so that they fit 
into a particular story put together for a particular practical purpose 
in a particular situation."^ This also brings about a new relation 
between theory and practice: 
At one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a 
consequence; at other times, it had an opposite sense and it was 
thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation 
of future theoretical forms. In any event, their relationship was 
understood in terms of a totalization. For us, however, the ques-
tion is seen in a different light. The relationships between 
theory and practice is more partial and fragmentary. On one 
side, a theory is always local and related to limited field. . • • 
Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, 
12 
and theory is a relay from one practice to another." 
Here Deleuze is thinking of what Foucault is doing with his studies on 
the varies forms of confinement and his organization of the information 
group for prisons (G.I.P.). There is no "application of a theory" in-
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volved, but rather the relay from a theoretical action to a practical 
action. 
3. Nomad Thought 
Now we come back to Nietzsche. In the essay "Nomad Thought" De-
leuze proposes a similar view on Nietzsche. Nietzsche attempts to pre-
vent his discourse from being codified, from being drawn back into that 
of traditional philosophy with his idiosyncratic use of language. "His 
masterful siege of the language permits him to transmit something un-
codifiable: the notion of style as politics." (NT p. 143) 
This is also a point for a general remark about my art of 
style. To communicate a state, an inward tension or pathos, by 
means of signs, including the tempo of these signs—that is the 
meaning of every style; and considering that the multiplicity of 
inward states is exceptionally large in my case, I have many 
stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style that has 
ever been at the disposal of one man. • • • Before me, it was not 
known what could be done with the German language—-what 
could be done with language in general. 
("Why I Write Such Good Books", EH p. 265) 
Nietzsche's texts do not make themselves available to the three in-
struments of recodification. They refuse to be understood as the crea-
tion or the applicatipn of a law; they do not contain any possibility of 
a contractual relation, nor do they offer the prospect of the estab-
lishing of an institution. His aphorisms refuse to be summed up simply. 
His ideas are presented in the form of a "plot", and it is impossible to 
draw from them any claim of universality, which is characteristic of tra-
ditLonal metaphysical philosophy.^ They "mean nothing" in that there 
is no hidden First Principle according to which a philosophical system 
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can be reconstructed from these texts. The writings of Nietzsche, in-
stead of pointing towards an inside, a hidden meaning, are grounded in 
"an immediate relation with the outside, the exterior" (NT p. 144) They 
are, like paintings and sketches, always waiting to be framed: “—but at 
what point does it [a painting] becomes handsome? From the moment one 
knows and feels that the movement, the framed line, comes from without, 
that it does not begin within the limits of the frame. It began beneath 
or beside the frame, and traverse the frame." {NT pp. 144-145) The 
reader is required to appropriate the text, to find an outside to frame 
it with this outside, to find the force that gives a new sense to it. In 
another passage Deleuze contrasts two conceptions of reading: 
There are two ways to read a book: one can take it for a box 
which points to an inside, in which case one will go looking for 
signifLeds, and then, if one is even more perverse or corrupt, 
one will embark on the search for the signifier. And the book 
which comes after, one will take it as another box, contained 
inside the previous one or perhaps containing it. One then wiH 
make comments, will interpret, will ask for explanations, will 
write the book of the book, ad infinitum. But there is another 
way: one takes the book as a small, a-signifying machine; the 
only problem then is whether it works and how it works. How 
does this work for you? If it does not work, if nothing happens, 
take another book. This reading is a reading in intensity: either 
something happens or it does not. There is nothing to explain, 
14 
nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. 
Nietzsche's texts are of the kind that offer themselves to a "reading in 
intensity". 
Following Deleuze's own suggestion, we ask: how does his reading 
of Nietzsche work? Deleuze calls the type of thinking developed from 
this reading "nomad thought". Nomad thought is opposed to "State phi-
60 
losophy"： "Philosophic discourse is born out of the imperial state, and 
it passes through innumerable metamorphoses. • . • Philosophic discourse 
has always been essentially related to law, institutions, and contracts 
一 w h i c h , taken together, constitute the subject matter of sovereignty 
and have been part of the history of sedentary peoples from the 
earliest despotic states to modern democracies." (NT pp. 148-149) 
"State philosophy" is Deleuze's name for what Nietzsche calls "meta-
physics". One of Nietzsche's contributions to the project of "overcom-
ing" or "going beyond" metaphysics is his persistent conviction that the 
reasons for this overcoming are practical (that is, ethical, or political, 
if we may still make use of such distinctions) rather than theoretical. 
It is not "on strictly rational grounds"边 that his suspkdon about meta-
physics is based; and his overcoming of metaphyskss does not evoke a 
"true truth" in contrast to the "false truth" of metaphysics that he has 
unmasked as "the history of an error". Among the fictions of reactive 
forces unmasked by Nietzsche in his demystificatiDn are the ideas of 
truth and ultimate ground, which are epitomized in the idea of God. Yet 
一Speaking of unmasking and demystificatiDn一must not Nietzsche's total 
critique include within its scope its own endeavor? Must not the idea 
• 
of a demystification that will reveal an ultimate truth itself be demy-
stified? Must not his unmasking carry with it a radical "unmasking of 
unmasking'* according to which "even the idea of a truth that reveals 
a masking, of the attempt and claim to reach a solid 'ground' beyond 
ideologies and every form of false consciousness, is, precisely, still a 
'human, all too human' devotion, still a mask"?^ It is true that in his 
writings Nietzsche announces repeatedly the effacement of the meta-
physical concept of an ultimate ground (Grund). Yet this attack on 
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metaphysics is not carried out in the name of a truer ground, otherwise 
it would still be trapped in another metaphysics which opposes a "true 
truth" to th � " f a l se truth" of the metaphysical idea of an ultimate 
ground. What he has sought to put under his suspicion is the idea of 
a true ground itself. The modes of presentation he employs ("Suppose 
we • • •” "Are there not grounds for the suspicion that • • •“ "I do not 
believe that • . .••) suggest attitudes more practical than theoretical, 
翁 
"not in theory but in praxis, in practice." (GS 372) Gianni Vattimo sums 
up this teaching of Nietzsche's clearly when he insightfully locates in 
Nietzsche the origin of the idea of metaphysics as a form of violence: 
The critique of metaphysics that most endured in his [Nie-
tzsche's] thought (and that thus determines our point of de-
parture) is the critique that would unmask metaphysics as a 
manifestatiDH of violence. . . . In any case, it is not in the name 
of theoretical motivations that one speaks today of going beyond 
metaphysics, as though its fault were that of furnishing a dis-
torted and false knowledge of a reality that could be understood 
adequately by other forms of knowledge, above all by science. 
Those who distrust metaphysics and think of going beyond it 
move instead within the horizon defined by Nietzsche when he 
writes that metaphysics is "an attempt to take by force the most 
fertile fields"." 
The word "violence" undoubtedly carries with it an ethical or poli-
tical tint. Metaphysics is violence not only in its attempt to devalue the 
sensuous and transitory by affirming universal and abstract essences; 
but also in its oppression of alterity (otherness). Thus understood, the 
"non-metaphysical thinking" will be a thinking that is able to open it-
self truly to alterity, and not to that "false alterity" that returns in the 
end to the grounding subject•幼 In some of his texts Nietzsche speaks 
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of the connection between metaphysics and authority: 
We see: an authority speakswho s p e a k s ? O n e may forgive 
human pride if it sought to make this authority as high as pos-
sible in order to feel as little humiliated as possible under it. 
Therefore~God speaks! 
One needed God as an unconditional sanction, with no court 
of appeal, as a "categorical imperator"—: or, if one believed in 
the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysic of unity, by 
virtue of which this is logical. 
(WP 275) 
How will such a "non-metaphysical thinking" set out to combat meta- • 
physics? Insofar as a thinking attempts to confront metaphysics, this 
thinking must employ its language. As we have seen from above, in 
order to confront "State Philosophy", nomad thought must speak the 
language of the State. 
One could not possibly reject the Scriptures without knowing 
how to read them, nor say philology without philosophy, nor, if 
need be, arrest philosophical discourse without philosophizmg. 
• . . One must refer—I am convinced~to the medium of all com-
prehension and of all understanding in which all truth is re-
flectedprecisely to Greek civilization, and to what it produced: 
• to the logos, to the coherent discourse of reason, to life in a 
19 
reasonable State. This is the true ground of all understanding. 
On the other hand, in its aggression against metaphysics, the nomad 
thought must not set up a new authority in opposition to the authority 
of metaphysics. Here the possibility of a non-violent act against the 
violence of metaphysics is also ruled out. Unlike those who propose a 
passive "overcoming" of traditional philosophy of representation with an 
"edifying philosophy'* which has "no more to offer than common sense 
. . . a b o u t knowledge and truth",® Nietzsche does not think that we 
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can, as it were, return to a common sense that is neutral and hence is 
devoid of the violence of metaphysical thinking. The thinking that sim-
ply reverses the metaphysical hierarchy is equally violent. For the 
nomad thought to be truly nomadic, it must not, in declaring war 
against State philosophy, let this war lead to the creation of a "nomadic 
State". It must resist the totalizing way of thinking of metaphysics. 
("We seek a kind of war machine that will not re-create a state appa-
ratus, a nomadic unit related to the outside that will not revive an 
internal despotic unity." NT p. 149) We have seen that in Nietzsche and 
Deleuze this is done by employing certain stylistic strategies that will 
prevent the nomad thought from becoming codified into a new State phi-
losophy. 
Thus the nomad thought must always remain in a relation with State 
philosophy that is marked by a certain tension. On the one hand, it has 
to raise war against the violence and authority of State philosophy, 
which is possible only by employing its language; while on the other 
hand it has to put itself under its own scrutiny and resist becoming 
another State philosophy. As a result the nomadic thinker has to give 
up the aspiration for a radical overcoming of metaphysics. Instead of 
looking forward to a leap "Beyond metaphysics" he will be content with 
a position on the margin of the State, and maintains a dialogical-
conversatiional relation to metaphysics, always confronting it as its 
other: 
But if Nietzsche does not belong to philosophy, it is perhaps 
because he was the first to conceive of another kind of dis-
course as counter-philosophy. This discourse is above all 
nomadic; its statements can be conceived as the products of a 
mobile war machine and not the utterances of a rational, admin-
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istrative machinery, whose philosophers would be bureaucrats of 
pure reason. 
(NT p. 149) 
• « 
4. To Con<dude • • • 
The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of 
life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of 
philosophical problems to get cured by only through a changed 
mode of thought, not through a medicine invented by an indivi-
dual. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
In his interpretation of Nietzsche Deleuze stresses the anti-meta-
physical thrust in Nietzsche's thinking. Unlike many other critics of 
metaphysics, Nietzsche's originality consists in his unmasking of meta-
physics as a form of violence. The totalizing thinking of metaphysics is, 
for Nietzsche, "an attempt to take by force the most fertile fields"; and 
its drive for an ultimate foundation is responsible for the advent of the 
history of Western man~that is, the advent of nihilism: 
What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I 
describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: 
the advent of nihilism. This history can be related even now; for 
necessity itself is at work here. This future speaks even now in 
a hundred signs》this destiny announces itself everywhere; for 
this music of the future all ear are cocked even now. For some 
time now, our whole European culture has been moving as 
toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing 
from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a 
river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that 
is afraid to reflect. 
(WP preface 2) 
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In his writing Nietzsche provides us with a narrative of this his-
tory, and he sets out to analyze the various forces that provide the 
impetus of its movement: ressentiment, bad conscienceall that which 
is exemplified in "Slave morality". What he seeks to destroy is not what 
previous thinkers have set forth as the ultimate, absolute ground 
(Being, the One, the Absolute, God • • • ) but rather the possibility of 
providing an ultimate ground. 
However, Nietzsche's endeavor seems to be plagued by one question: 
to what extent is his thinking free of metaphysics* totalizing mode of 
thought? When he declares the death of God, does he at the same time 
renounce what is more essential, this is. His place? In this chapter we 
have seen that in his interpretation of Nietzsche Deleuze is also dis-
cerning of this question. To those who accuse Nieztsche of being unable 
to transcend metaphysics, our answer is that the very idea of "tran-
scending", "going beyond" metaphysics or, as it is sometimes so called, 
a radical overcoming of metaphysics still remains within the categories 
of metaphysics. To speak of a "beyond" of metaphysics itself is to 
employ the metaphors of metaphysical thinking. If Nietzsche contends 
that his critique of metaphysics is total, it must include within its scope 
its own endeavor. This critique must not be carried out in the name of 
a truer ground, in the name of a "true truth" as opposed to the "false 
truth" of metaphysics. Yet we must bear in mind that this is no failure 
on Nietzsche's part that he is unable to reveal a "true truth" undis-
torted by metaphysics, for what he is trying to show is precisely that 
these notions such as "true truth" have to be given up. He does not 
fulfil the undertaking of a radical overcoming of metaphysics because 
he discerns in it the same kind of urge for beyond, the same totalizing 
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conception of thought that is characteristic of metaphysics. What he is 
trying to do is rather to give a new sense to the phrase "beyond 
metaphysics", a sense that is much less grandiose. The kind of thinking 
that is "beyond metaphysics" in the Nietzschean sense will be able to 
learn from that "history of errors". It will be able to recognize that it 
is not possible to break with metaphysics's language any more than we 
could break with our history and tradition. It will always maintain a 
relation with metaphysics that is marked by a certain tension. On the 
one hand, it has to raise war against metaphysics' violence and author-
ity, which is possible only by employing its language; while on the 
other hand it has to put itself under its own scrutiny and resist 
becoming another metaphysics. The Nietzschean or the nomadic thinker 
will have to give up the aspiration for a radical overcoming of 
metaphysics. Instead of looking forward to a leap "Beyond metaphysics" 
he will be content with a position on the margins of the State, and with 
maintaining a dialogical-conversational relation to metaphysics, always 
confronting it as its other. 
The critique of metaphysics, the analysis of ressentiment and bad 
consciencethat is, the reactive forcesthese constitute the negative 
(i.e” destructive) side of Nietzsche's thinking. However, this thinking 
also has its positive side (otherwise how can it claim to be the thinking 
of the active and the mastery?) As it is also prominent in Deleuze,s in-
terpretation, Nietzsche anticipates a way of thinking that is devoid of 
the traits of Slave morality, that is relieved of the metaphysical need 
of an ultimate ground. This is what Deleuze calls "the new image of 
thought". In the new image of thought, the element of thought is not 
truth but sense and value. Its categories are not truth and falsity but 
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the noble and the base, the high and the low; and its enemy is not 
error but stupidity, a base way of thinking. 
In short, the new image of thought implied by Nietzsche's critique 
turns thinking into an interpretation and evaluation. The elements of 
this thinking is not truth and falsity but sense and value. The aim of 
his critique is not justificatiDn but a different way of feeling, "another 
sensibility". 
Like the meaning of the death of God which is plural, this new 
thinking, which Deleuze calls the nomad thought, goes by many names. 
Nietzsche calls it "the Gay Science", "free spiritedness" or the "philo-
sophy of morning". The declaration of the death of God is not a meta-
physical statement describing the non-existence of God supported by 
any proof or argument, but rather a narration of an experience that 
Occidental humanity—man in the Abendland—has undergone. If God is 
dead, that is, if the idea of an ultimate ground has lost its own ground, 
then this can only be demonstrated with an appeal to experience. The 
thinking after the death of God, the thinking that recognizes "untruth 
as a condition of life" (BGE 4), is the thinking without ground. Though 
it views the history before its rise as the "history of an error", it does 
not treat these errors as "false truths" waiting to be contradicted by 
a "true truth" which will be disclosed in further investigations, but 
rather as a kind of wandering that constitutes our tradition, to which 
we are tied only by a certain historical contingency that is devoid of 
any relationship to a fundamental truth. 
Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits" feel, when we hear 
the news that "the old god is dead", as if a new dawn shone on 
us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, 
expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, 
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even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may ven-
ture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring 
of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, 
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Abstract 
This essay is concerned with Gilles Deleuze丨s interpretation of 
Nietzsche, focusing on the question of its vulnerablity to attacks about 
its reflexivity. In his Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze puts forwards 
an interpretation of Nietzsche as setting forth a critical philosophy. The 
aim of this critical philosophy is to "go beyond" metaphysical thinking, 
which is exemplified in Hegel's dialectical thinking. In Hegel's philo-
sophy, difference and otherness are always subsumed under identity 
and self sameness, as is evident in his "dialectic of Master and Slave". 
In retelling this story Deleuze (with Nietzsche before him) seeks to find 
a way of affirming difference without having to return it to identity. He 
finds the solution in the distinctions between the active affirmation of 
difference and its reactive negation, Le., opposition. The Master actively 
affirms himself in his difference from the Slave, whereas the Slave 
reactively opposes himself to the Master. From this Nietzsche develops 
the criticism of traditional metaphysical thinking as reactive thinking, 
leading man towards nihilism. 
However, a problem pervades in Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche: 
What wiU be the result if his criticism is applied to his (and Nie-
tzsche's) own way of thinking? How is his way of thinking "beyond" 
traditional metaphysics? In the second part of the essay Deleuze's 
• interpretation of Nietzsche will be evaluated in the light of these pro-
blems. Our conclusion is that since the attempt to go beyond meta-
physics inevitably employs the language of metaphysics, and that the 
idea of a "Beyond" itself belongs to the metaphysical tradition, a 
"radical overcoming" of metaphysics is impossible, as it evokes the 
totalizing way of thinking that is characteristic of metaphysics. The 
"nomad thought"the kind of thinking that Deleuze calls for "after 
metaphysics"—must instead maintain a marginal position in philosophy 
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